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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981545-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
ANDREW HALES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant directly appeals from his unconditional guilty pleas to three counts of 
forgery, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998), and 
from his conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1998). This Court has 
jurisdiction over appeals from third degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did defendant waive his claim that he did not make a knowing and valid 
waiver of his right to counsel before entering his guilty pleas where he did not condition any 
of his pleas on that claim? 
Standard of Review: Because defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal, 
there is no trial court ruling to review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules govern this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State charged defendant in a December 8, 1997 information with seven counts 
of forgery, a third degree felony (R.2161:19-25).1 In a separate information filed December 
22,1997, the State charged defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and one count of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor (R.2382:01-02). 
!This appeal is from two district court cases, No. 971902161 and No. 971902382, 
that have been consolidated for purposes of appeal (see Addendum A). Because there are 
two district court pleadings file, one for each case, citations to the pleadings file will refer 
to the last four digits of the applicable district court number, followed by the internal 
record cite, e.g., R.2161:19. Similarly, citations to the transcripts will refer to the record 
number stamped on the cover page, followed by the internal page number, e.g., R. 134:16. 
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At defendant's initial appearance on the forgery charges, the trial court appointed the 
Public Defenders Association of Weber County ("PDA") to represent him (R.2161:39-41). 
The court read defendant the information and advised him of his rights and the potential 
penalties for the forgery charges (R.2161:40-41). A week later, defendant waived his right 
to a preliminary hearing on the forgery charges (R2161:41-42;R. 134:4-5). Defense counsel 
informed the court that he believed they would be able to negotiate a plea agreement on the 
forgery charges, and asked for a one week continuance to prepare "the paperwork" (R. 134:4). 
Defense counsel also asked that the forgery case be combined with the drug case (R.2161:41-
42;R.134:7-8). 
The court also appointed PDA to represent defendant on the drug charges (R.2382:7). 
At defendant's first appearance on the drug charges, the trial court read the information and 
advised defendant of the charges and possible penalties (R.2382:7). After a preliminary 
hearing on January 14, 1998, the court bound defendant over on both drug charges 
(R.2382.9). The court again read the information to defendant and advised him of his rights 
and the possible penalties (R.2382:10). 
Subsequent pretrial and dispositional hearings on both the forgery and drug charges 
were continued several times at the request of one or both parties (R.2382:85, 89, 108; 
R.2161:42, 50, 53, 58, 59,60,61,74,79; R.134:l 1). On February 18,1998, defendant filed 
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a pro se 120-day disposition request on the drug charges (R.2382:104).2 Defendant filed the 
same pro se request in the forgery cases on April 14, 1998 (R.2161:65). 
On May 13,1998, the State filed a second information adding 18 new forgery charges 
to the original seven, making a total of 25 forgery counts (R.2161:1-18). The court read the 
additional charges to defendant and explained that each of the forgery counts was punishable 
by a maximum fine of $5,000 and zero-to-five years in prison (R. 134:14). Defendant stated 
that he understood the charges (id). 
After a preliminary hearing on the second information, the trial court bound defendant 
over for trial on the new forgery counts (R.2161:87-89;R. 134:32). The court again read the 
additional counts to defendant and he pled not guilty (R.2161:90-92;R.134:13-14). 
At a pretrial conference on June 17, 1998, for both the drug and forgery charges, 
defendant's attorney informed the court that defendant wanted to represent himself 
(R.2161:98;R.2382:123;R.134:37-38). Defense counsel explained thathe and defendant had 
a serious disagreement when defendant changed his mind about accepting a plea agreement 
that his counsel had negotiated with the State (R. 134:37-38). Defendant confirmed this and 
informed the court that he wanted to represent himself (R. 134:39). 
2This request was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1995), which 
provides that a prisoner with pending charges may demand that the charge be brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. Subsection (4) provides 
that if the prosecutor, without good cause, fails to have the matter heard within the 
required time, the case must be dismissed with prejudice. 
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The trial court engaged defendant in a colloquy in which the court fully advised 
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation (R. 134:39-44). (A 
transcript of this hearing is reproduced in Addendum B). The court first ascertained that 
defendant had received a "GED high school diploma," but that he had never before 
represented himself in a legal proceeding (R. 134:39). Defense counsel, however, interjected 
that he and defendant had talked several times and had discussed "different aspects" of case 
law and statutes that defendant had brought to counsel (R. 134:39-40). Defense counsel also 
pointed out that defendant had filed a 120-day disposition notice on his own (R. 134:40). 
Counsel was "impressed with [defendant's] level of intelligence and his ability to discuss 
these things intelligently and have a grasp of the issues" (R. 134:40). Counsel reiterated that 
the only problem between him and his client was that they did not "see eye to eye on the 
strength and relative abilities as far as the State's, strength of the State's case" (R. 134:40). 
The trial court then advised defendant that "there are certain dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation," specifically that defendant was not trained in the law 
and that there might be "procedural matters, strategic matters and legal matters with which 
[defendant] might not be cognizant of or quite frankly oblivious of or not be aware o f 
(R.134:41-42). The court also explained that defendant would be held to the same standard 
as an attorney (R. 134:42). Defendant stated that he understood this (R. 134:42). 
Defense counsel added that the prosecutor had informed him that more forgery 
charges, in addition to the 25 already filed, could be filed if a plea agreement could not be 
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charges (R. 135:76). In exchange, the State would dismiss the possession of drug 
paraphernalia charge and the remaining 22 forgery counts (R. 135:76-78). Boyle explained 
that the State also agreed to not bring any additional forgery counts for any incidents that the 
State was aware of at the time and that the State would recommend that any prison terms be 
imposed concurrently (R. 135:76-77). 
The court then asked defendant, "You've gone over this with your attorney, Mr. 
Hales, and this is what you've decided to do?" (R. 135:79). The defendant answered 
affirmatively (R. 135:79). After engaging in a thorough colloquy as required by rule 1 l,Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court took defendant's conditional guilty plea to one count 
of possession of a controlled substance and his unconditional pleas to three counts of forgery 
(R. 135:79-86). The court also informed defendant that he had only thirty days in which to 
file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 135:82). 
The court sentenced defendant to four concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years 
(R.2382:135-36;R.2161:116-18). Defendant was given credit for time served and ordered 
to pay restitution in the amount of $2,317.79 (id.). A public defender was present at the 
sentencing hearing (R.23 82:135 ;R.2161:116). 
Defendant, through counsel, filed two notices of appeal, one from the drug conviction 
and one from the forgery convictions (R.23 82:138;R.2161:121). At defendant's request both 
appeals were consolidated for purposes of appeal (see Addendum A). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that he did not make a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to counsel. Defendant waived this non-jurisdictional claim of a pre-plea 
constitutional violation when he entered his voluntary guilty pleas without making them 
conditional on the preservation of this issue. Moreover, defendant's challenge to his pleas 
is not properly before the court because he has never moved to withdraw them. Even if 
defendant's claim were properly before the Court, it fails because it is not supported by the 
record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS 
DEPRIVED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE 
ENTERED HIS VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEAS 
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel when the trial court allowed him to proceed pro se for a period prior 
to entry of his guilty pleas. Defendant asserts, in effect, that his waiver of counsel was 
invalid because the trial court did not ascertain that he comprehended the nature of the 
charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments. Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter '*Br. Aplt."] at 6-7. Defendant waived that claim when he entered his guilty 
pleas without conditioning them on the right to challenge the validity of his prior waiver of 
counsel. 
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A. Defendant waived his claim. 
As a general rule, *4a voluntary [and unconditional] guilty plea is a waiver of the right 
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including pre-plea constitutional violations." State v. 
Jennings, 875 P.2d 566,567 n.l (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 
1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,938 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Penman, 964 
P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App. 
1994); State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992); State ex rel E.G.T., 808 P.2d 
138,138-39 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam). Once a defendant has admitted his factual guilt 
by pleading guilty, *" [h]e may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty 
plea.'" Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1277-78 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 158, 267, 93 
S.Ct. 1602, 1608(1973)). 
An exception to this general rule exists when the plea entered by the defendant, with 
the consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court, specifically preserves an issue 
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant prevails on appeal. Sery, 758 P.2d 
at 938-39; State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,1271 (Utah App. 1990); see Smith, 833 P.2d at 372. 
Here, defendant specifically conditioned his plea to the possession of a controlled 
substance charge on the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his pro se motion to dismiss 
for failure to bring his case to disposition within 120 days (R. 135:79-86). Defendant, 
however, does not raise that issue in his brief; he asserts only that he did not knowingly 
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waive his right to counsel. Br. Aplt. 6-7. Defendant's other three pleas were unconditional 
(R. 135:79-86). 
Defendant does not challenge the validity of his pleas, that is, their knowing and 
voluntary character. He complains only that he was denied a nonjurisdictional constitutional 
right to counsel before he entered his pleas. See E.G.T., 808 P.2d at 140 (holding that denial 
of juvenile's right to counsel in juvenile court certification proceedings was waivable, and 
therefore nonjurisdictional; juvenile's subsequent voluntary and unconditional guilty plea in 
district court mooted his constitutional claim). Accordingly, defendant waived his claim that 
he was denied the assistance of counsel by entering voluntary guilty pleas that were not 
conditioned on the right to appeal this issue. 
Moreover, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court because he has never 
filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993) 
(declining to review defendant's attack on validity of his guilty pleas where he had never 
moved to withdraw them). Utah law does not permit a defendant to directly attack an 
unconditional guilty plea on appeal. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343, 344-45 (Utah 
App. 1988); see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067. Rather, a defendant must first file a motion 
to withdraw the plea, thereby allowing the trial court an opportunity to consider the merits 
of the defendant's arguments and to correct any error.4 Summers, 759 P.2d at 344-45; 
4Clearly, defendant could have appealed from his plea to the drug charge on the 
issue of the failure to bring that case to disposition within 120 days because that plea was 
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Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067; see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987). 
The defendant may then appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw. Summers, 759 P.2d 
at 344-45. A defendant may not attack his unconditional pleas for the first time on appeal.5 
See id; Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067. 
In sum, defendant waived his claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel when he voluntarily entered his pleas and did not condition them upon being able 
to appeal that issue. Also, defendant may not attack his pleas for the first time on appeal 
because he has never filed a motion to withdraw his plea. 
B. Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. 
Even if defendant's claim were properly before the Court, it is wholly without merit. 
The record is quite clear that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and 
voluntary. 
specifically conditioned upon his right to do so (R.135:75, 79-86). State v. Montoya, 887 
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1994); Sery, 758 P.2d at 938-39. However, as stated, defendant has 
not raised that issue on appeal. Defendant's guilty pleas are unconditional with respect to 
all other issues. 
5It is now too late for defendant to file a motion to withdraw his pleas. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(b) (1995) requires that a motion to withdraw a plea be made within 30 
days of the date the plea was entered. This Court has held that the 30-day limitation 
period is jurisdictional so long as the defendant has been informed of it. State v. Price, 
837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992). Here, the trial court orally informed defendant of 
this limitation period before it accepted his pleas (R. 135:82). Under these circumstances, 
defendant may only attack his pleas in a collateral proceeding, and even then he must 
overcome procedural bars. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d at 343-44; Lancaster v. Cook, 753 
P.2d 505, 506 (Utah 1988). 
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Before taking a waiver of the right to counsel, a trial court must first advise a 
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, "so that the record will 
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." State v. 
Beaton, 958 P.2d 911,918 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Frampton, 111 
P.2dl83, 187-88 (Utah 1987). 
In addition, the trial court should (X) advise the defendant of his constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent 
himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity 
to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent 
himself, including the expectation that the defendant will comply with 
technical rules...; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature 
of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. The preferred method for determining the validity of a waiver of 
counsel is a colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant. Id.; Frampton, 737 
P.2dat 187. 
The trial court in this case performed a thorough colloquy in which it advised 
defendant of all the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation (R. 134:39-44; Add. B). 
It then found that defendant was aware of the dangers of self-representation and that he had 
the capacity to make that choice (R.l34:43-44;Add. B). Defendant does not deny this, nor 
does he assert that he did not in fact make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to 
counsel. Br. Aplt. 8-9. Rather, he only asserts that the trial court did not ascertain that he 
comprehended the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of possible penalties. 
Br. Aplt. 8. 
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The record does not support defendant's claim. The colloquy clearly demonstrates 
that defendant understood the nature of the charges and the disadvantages of self-
representation (R. 134:39-44). In addition, the same judge who took the waiver of counsel 
had already conducted several hearings in which the charges and the range of possible 
penalties were read and explained to defendant (R.2161:40-41, 90-92;R.2382:7, 9, 10, 
R.134:4-5, 13-14). There was therefore no need for the judge to inform defendant of the 
range of permissible penalties at the waiver of counsel hearing. Defendant also sat through 
a preliminary hearing on the drug charges and on the forgery charges in the second 
information (R.2382:9;R.2161:90-92). The trial court therefore properly found, based its 
thorough, searching colloquy and its prior interactions with defendant, that defendant was 
well aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver of 
counsel was knowing and voluntary (R. 135:43-44). 
Moreover, despite defendant's claims to the contrary, the transcript to the plea hearing 
demonstrates that defendant in fact had the full assistance of counsel both in negotiating and 
in entering his pleas. Just as the trial court was setting defendant's matters for trial, the 
parties requested a short recess so that public defendant Michael Boyle could speak to 
defendant (R. 135:74). Afterwards, Mr. Boyle represented to the court that they had reached 
an agreement and then stated that agreement on the record (R. 135:74-75). Although Boyle 
stated that he was only "guiding" defendant through the process, he personally explained the 
plea agreement to the court in detail, including that the plea to possession of a controlled 
14 
substance was a conditional one under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Also, 
when it came time to enter his plea, defendant turned to Boyle and asked him what he should 
say (R. 135:86). The foregoing indicates that it was Boyle, and not defendant acting pro se, 
who negotiated the agreement with the prosecutor. It also shows that Boyle fully represented 
defendant during the plea-taking hearing. 
To the extent that defendant also claims that he was denied the assistance of counsel 
at sentencing, that claim is also not supported in the record. There is no transcript of the 
sentencing hearing as the recording of that hearing could not be found. See Addendum C. 
The minute entries to the sentencing hearing, however, show that a PDA attorney was present 
with defendant at sentencing (R.2382:135;R.2161:116). Defendant has not pointed to any 
evidence in the record that defendant was not in fact represented at sentencing. Br. Aplt. 8-9. 
Absent such record evidence, defendant has not shown that he was unfairly denied his right 
to counsel at sentencing. See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (appellate court 
cannot rule on question which depends for its existence on alleged facts not supported by 
record); State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) (failure to provide 
adequate record on appeal results in appellate court's presuming correctness of trial court's 
ruling or regularity of proceedings below).6 
6
 While it is true that there is no transcript of the sentencing hearing because of an 
inability to locate the audiotape of the proceedings, defendant had the option of 
demonstrating that he was not represented at the sentencing hearing by moving to 
supplement the record under rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although this 
option was explained to defendant in a letter from this Court (Add. C), he apparently 
chose not to use it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
/ST 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ f d a y of <TuJ&l 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
!#Jw. '<a^ 4-
B. DUPAIX 
'ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Attorney for Appellant 
Public Defender Association of Weber County 
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ADDENDUM A 
Order Consolidating Appeals 
AT ORNEY GENERAL 
MAR I I 1999 
APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
MAR 1 1 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Andrew Hales, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case Nos. 981545-CA 
981546-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion, 
filed February 17, 1999, to consolidate the above-captioned 
appeals. Appellee stipulated to the motion. 
It appears that judicial economy will result by 
consolidating the appeals for a single decermination. Now, 
therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned appeals 
are consolidated as State v. Hales, case number 981545-CA. 
Appellant's brief is due thirty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this f j day of March, 1999. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
Transcript of June 17,1998 Pretrial Hearing 
containing Defendant's Waiver of Counsel 
1 
2 
3 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HEARING 
Case No. 971902161 
Appeal #981545 
Hon. W. Brent West 
STATE 
VS 
ANDREW 
OP 
• 
UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
JAMES HALES, ) 
Defendant. ) 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of June, 
1998 this matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-named court. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and 
represented by counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: 
LASZIO DAROCAI, ESQ. 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., #224 
OGDEN UT 84401 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
JAMES M. RETALLICK(?), ESQ. 
WEBER CO. PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOC 
2568 WASHINGTON BLVD., #203 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
2 (June 17th, 1998) . 
3 MR. RETALLICK?: If we'll call Mr. Hales. 
4 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
5 MR. RETALLICK?: It starts number 57 on 
6 the calendar. 
7 THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Andrew 
8 James Hales, case number 971902161. Also case 
9 number 971902382. 
10 THE JUDGE: All right. Has this been 
11 resolved? 
12 MR. RETALLICK?: No, it hasn't, Your 
13 Honor. I thought it had been resolved. Mr. Hales 
14 and I talked Friday on the telephone and he 
15 indicated that he would reluctantly take a plea 
16 negotiation that the State had offered which I felt 
17 was a very good plea negotiation. I came over to 
18 the court to inform the court of that, I informed 
19 the county attorney's office of that and we called 
20 off the jury. 
21 And then when I get back to my office my 
22 secretary says Mr. Hales had called and he wants to 
23 go to trial. I met with Mr. Hales and presented to 
24 him what the plea negotiation was in writing. As a 
25 matter of fact I prepared a plea, a statement in 
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1 advance of plea. And Mr. Hales, I asked him to 
2 review that and talk to me this morning. When I 
3 came over and talk to Mr. Hales he indicates his 
4 desire to go to trial. I said I would like you to 
5 sign, put together a writing, I want to put 
6 together a writing and have you sign it stating 
7 that you're doing this against my express 
8 instructions because I believe that this is in your 
9 best interest. And he indicates to me now that he 
10 would like to represent himself on these charges. 
11 THE JUDGE: All right. Well let's back 
12 up. I thought there was a negotiation on the one 
13 on the 15th that we passed the trial. Was that, I 
14 thought that was ironclad. 
15 MR. RETALLICK?: Well, I talked to 
16 Mr. Hales over the phone. He told me yes, he 
17 would accept that. 
18 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
19 MR. RETALLICK?: And, and then after I 
20 went to the county attorney's office and came over 
21 to the court, I got back to my office a little 
22 after 5:00 and my secretary said Mr. Hales had 
23 called and, and said no, he wanted to go to trial. 
24 THE JUDGE: So is that correct, 
25 Mr. Hales? 
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1 THE DEPENDANT: Yes. 
2 THE JUDGE: And it's your intention to 
3 represent yourself? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
5 THE JUDGE: You understand that you are 
6 entitled to have an attorney. Apparently you and 
7 your attorney though have reached a crossroads 
8 where you don't necessarily agree on how this case 
9 should proceed in the future. Is that correct? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Correct. 
11 THE JUDGE: And you have decided now 
12 today voluntarily and in open court that you intend 
13 to waive your right to have an attorney. 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Correct. 
15 THE JUDGE: Tell me a little bit about 
16 yourself. What kind of educational background do 
17 you have? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I got a GED high school 
19 diploma (short inaudible) . 
2 0 THE JUDGE: Have you had any kind of 
21 involvement in representing yourself in the law 
22 before? 
2 3 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
24 MR. RETALLICK?: Your Honor, if I might 
25 add to that. Mr. Hales and I talked several 
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times. He's brought in case law, we've discussed 
case law, we've discussed different aspects of the 
case law. He's brought in statutes and he's filed 
a, I was unaware he filed a 120 day notice or 
disposition notice--
THE JUDGE: We're going to deal with that 
today as well. 
MR. RETALLICK?: And, and so I quite 
frankly, Your Honor, I've been impressed with 
Mr. Hales' level of intelligence and his ability to 
discuss these things intelligently and have a grasp 
of the issues. It's just that we don't see eye to 
eye on the strength and relative abilities as far 
as the State's, strength of the State's case so... 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So I guess what 
you're saying is for the record you would concur 
with the inquiry that I'm now required to make--
MR. RETALLICK?: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: -- in regards to whether or 
not a defendant can, in fact should represent 
themselves or have the ability to represent 
themselves. 
Honor 
MR. RETALLICK?: That's correct, Your 
THE JUDGE: And you're of the opinion as 
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1 is counsel over the period of time that you think 
2 that he is adequately or capable of representing 
3 himself. Is that correct? 
4 MR. RETALLICK?: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE JUDGE: All right. 
6 MR. RETALLICK?: He's done, like I say 
7 he's done the case law research and--
8 THE JUDGE: Does the State have a 
9 position? 
10 MR. DAROCZI: Well, I think in light of 
11 the, there's a new case that came down. 
12 THE JUDGE: Yes, it's on my desk. I've 
13 got to make the inquiry. 
14 MR. DAROCZI: There's a colloquy that the 
15 Court needs to go through with, with him and I 
16 think that sets out the steps. 
17 THE JUDGE: Deputy Lobato, I'll never 
18 tell you where it is so we'll take a short recess 
19 and I'll go get it myself. I know where it's at. 
20 I'll be right back. 
21 (Short break) 
22 (Court called to order) 
23 THE JUDGE: All right. I found it. It's 
24 State versus Heaton. I'm familiar with that case. 
25 That's a case that I preliminary, I held the 
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1 preliminary hearing and I believe Judge Glasmann 
2 tried it. 
3 A couple of things. Mr. Hales we've, 
4 we've made the threshold as to your ability to 
5 represent yourself and your decision to knowingly 
6 and voluntarily represent yourself in this 
7 particular situation and waive your right to an 
8 attorney. You understand that there are certain 
9 dangers and disadvantages of self-representation? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
11 THE JUDGE: You understand that you are 
12 not law trained and there may very well be 
13 procedural matters, strategic matters and legal 
14 matters with which you might not be cognizant of or 
15 quite frankly oblivious of or not be aware of and 
16 that the fact that you choose to represent yourself 
17 that you will be treated as if, you know, you are 
18 any other lawyer. In other words, the Court 
1 9 I] doesn't treat you differently or hold you to a 
20 || different standard simply because as a layman you 
21 || choose to represent yourself. You will be held to 
22 || the same standard that I would hold any other 
23 || attorney to. You understand that? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
25 || MR. RETALLICK?: Your Honor, if I might. 
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1 || THE JUDGE: Yes. 
2 (( MR. RETALLICK?: There is also one 
3 additional thing I would like to place on the 
4 record that the County has informed us that they 
5 have other charges, other forgeries that they are 
6 considering on filing and that they most likely 
7 will do so if Mr. Hales continues to push all 
8 matters to trial. And so the public defenders 
9 would just like to notify the Court and Mr. Hales 
10 that he would also be expected to represent himself 
11 on those, that he can't bring us in for some and 
12 dismiss us on the others. And that's our concern. 
13 THE JUDGE: You understand that? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 
15 THE JUDGE: All right. You've thought 
16 about this, you are aware of the dangers, you've 
17 been warned about it. It appears to me that you 
18 have the capacity intellectually and otherwise to 
19 choose to represent yourself. You have done 
20 considerable legal research in here and I'm 
21 inclined to allow you to proceed pro se but you are 
22 fully cognizant and aware of that? 
2 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 THE JUDGE: And you are telling me now 
25 here in open court that you are knowingly and 
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1 voluntarily waiving your right to counsel. Is that 
2 correct? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 THE JUDGE: All right. Well then with 
5 that the Court will make a finding that that waiver 
6 is appropriate and you may proceed pro se. 
7 Next matter, I received a copy of a letter 
8 that you sent to Paula Carr, clerk of court. You 
9 needed to know how much it cost to have the hearing 
10 of March 4th, tape 304, count 1051 transcribed and 
11 so that you might make arrangements to have it done 
12 or paid for on the outside. Ms. Carr advised me 
13 to inform you that the cost of the tape is $15. 
14 It will be $3 postage unless someone comes down and 
15 picks it up. And the cost of transcription depends 
16 upon which transcriber you go to. I mean they 
17 transcribe it from the video to the written. It 
18 depends upon who you hire. Different transcribers 
19 charge different rates all within a range. 
2 0 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
21 THE JUDGE: So if you intend simply to 
22 have a copy of the tape that's $15 plus $3 
23 postage. If you intend to reduce it down to 
24 writing she said it would depend upon who you had 
25 to transcribe it and you would have to deal with 
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ADDENDUM C 
Letter from Court of Appeals 
James Z. Davis 
Presiding Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench 
Judge 
Judith ML Billings 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Norman EL Jackson 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
Utat) Court ot appeal* 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900 
Judges'Reception (801) 578-3950 
FAX (801) 578-3999 
TDD (801) 578-3940 
November 30,1998 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Appellate Court Administrator 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Randine Salerno 
Public Defender Association, Inc. 
of Weber County 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: State v. Andrew Hales 
CaseNo.981545-CA 
Dear Ms. Salerno: 
On November 27, 1998, this court received notification from Penny Abbott, CSR, that the 
transcripts were filed in the trial court on November 24, 1998. Ms. Abbott also indicated in the 
notification that a transcript of two requested dates were not available. The 5/27/97 plea hearing 
is apparently not available because "the clerks notes indicate that no hearing was held." The 
8/5/98 transcript of the sentencing hearing is not available because the tape could not be found. 
A copy of Ms. Abbott's notification is enclosed herewith because it does not appear that a copy 
was forwarded to you. Because not all transcripts that you requested are available, please advise 
this court within 14 days from the date hereof if you intend to proceed with the available 
transcripts or if you intend to pursue other remedies under Rule 11, Utah R. App. P., as to the 
transcripts that are unavailable. 
[ATI 
L
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Ene. 
cc: 
Christine Soltis, Assistant Attc Drney General 
Yours truly, 
/ 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
